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Abstract: How does the uncertain provision of external nance aect
investment projects' default probability and liquidity risk? In this paper I
study the strategic interaction between many creditors and a single borrower
in the context of a two-period investment project requiring external credit.
Loans mature in one period but the project requires two periods to complete.
The key working assumptions are that creditors are risk-averse and that any
uncertainty is common knowledge: information about the fundamentals can
be incomplete but not asymmetric. Mixed and perfect Bayesian strategies
are used to compute the equilibrium probabilities of default and early liqui-
dation. The impact of the maturity structure on default and liquidity risk
is a function of the underlying structural and stochastic parameters and in-
vestors' beliefs about the state of fundamentals. The implications for banking
regulation are assessed under xed and variable loan rates. An open range of
fundamentals is derived outside of which default and liquidity risk are either
zero or one. The cyclical properties of default and liquidity risk are shown
to depend sensitively on the relative cost of early liquidation to the borrower
and the creditors, hence also on the regulatory policy stance.
JEL Classication: C72, F32, F34
Keywords: Strategic default, liquidity risk, project nance, nancial
regulation, cyclicality
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1 Introduction
How does the uncertain provision of external funding aect investment project
outcomes? The recent nancial crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America and
the resulting sharp declines in real output have focussed research attention
on the role of the available amount of liquidity|and the lack of it|in bring-
ing about crises which become self-fullling. The two main types of crises
models are fundamental-based and belief-based. The rst category starts
with Krugman (1979), in which a deterministically deteriorating current ac-
count results in devaluation, while the second is associated with the work of
Obstfeld (1996,1997). Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that beliefs-based
currency crises can yield a unique equilibrium in the presence of asymmetric
information about the fundamentals.
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More generally, liquidity is determined
at the level of microeconomic decision-makers (individual creditors/investors)
and translated into aggregate liquidity. Holmstrom and Tirole (1996, 1998)
show that if markets are incomplete then entrepreneurs may be unable to in-
sure themselves against exogenous shocks to net worth. Investment projects
that are socially valuable may thus be prematurely terminated.
In this paper, I study the dynamic provision of liquidity to an investment
project requiring external funding as a two-period game between many risk-
averse lenders and a single borrower. Unlike Bulow and Rogo (1989a,b)
and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), the debt is privately held and there
is no possibility for strategic recontracting and rescheduling. The project
has constant returns to scale with respect to the internal and external fund-
ing obtained. Investment performance is a linear function of a shock to
macroeconomic fundamentals which is only realized after lending has been
committed. At the outset, outside investors decide how much to lend based
on their individual risk aversion. It is assumed that the maturity of the loan
1
For a survey of the fundamental and belief-based crisis literature see Chui et al. (2000).
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is one period, but the investment project requires two periods to complete.
The borrower cannot choose the maturity structure: at the end of the rst
period, investors may decide not to roll over their loan and instead withdraw.
Early withdrawal attracts a penalty which is increasing in the amount of in-
dividual investment, but bounded by limited liability. The disruption to the
project brought about by early liquidation is also linearly increasing in the
amount of credit withdrawn. Faced with a balance sheet structured with a
long-term asset and short-term external liabilities, the borrower's position is
therefore subject to liquidity and interest rate risk.
There are three stages in the analysis. In the rst, the loan rate is xed
and the game is sequential. Information about the fundamentals is then
complete and perfect. I obtain Nash equilibria in pure dominant strategies
and show the existence of a range of fundamentals below which all lenders
withdraw early, and above which they all roll over into the second period.
The properties of this range are characterised as a function of the underlying
parameters. These include the project's loan rate, the riskless (world) interest
rate, the penalty for early withdrawal and the disruption it causes the project,
the contribution to project nance of the borrower's internal endowment, and
the probability distributions of the fundamentals and lenders' risk aversion.
In the second stage, the loan rate is xed and the game is one of com-
plete but imperfect information. The project's default probability and the
degree of early liquidation are then determined endogenously as part of mixed
strategies Nash equilibrium. In the third stage, I introduce a variable loan
rate and incomplete information about the fundamentals. Importantly, how-
ever, information is symmetric: the lenders and borrower all observe the
fundamental realisation, but are uncertain of the true underlying state of the
world, good or bad. All risk is, therefore, systematic. This is founded on the
premise that, in globalised markets, extrinsic uncertainty|that is, lack of
common knowledge|matters as much as, if not more than, the asymmetric
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information channel. This premise contrasts the seminal work of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), where lenders refuse to nance an illiquid borrower be-
cause of strategic uncertainty about other lenders' actions.
2
A rational set of prior beliefs and Bayesian updates is developed which
leads to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterisation. The degree of risk
aversion and the strategic interaction of lenders and borrower turn out to
have strong implications for aggregate liquidity provision. The model pro-
vides a mechanism for assessing recent alternative proposals for international
nancial regulation reform aimed at preventing nancial crises.
3
In particu-
lar, the desirability of imposing restrictions on short-term capital ows can
be analysed via the impact on the project's default probability of varying the
penalty charged to creditors for liquidating early. In turn, the impact of this
penalty on liquidity risk is a function of the disruption that early withdrawal
causes the investment project. The disruption is assumed to be increasing in
the amount of outside credit, reecting the project's sensitivity to short-term
reversals of investor sentiment.
The main ndings can be summarised as follows. Assuming a uniform fun-
damental distribution, equilibrium liquidity risk is found to be pro-cyclical,
that is positivelty correlated with the business cycle. Consequently, there
is a smaller likelihood of capital ow reversals in periods of macroeconomic
slowdown. Strategic liquidity provision can thus be said to exert a stabilising
inuence over the business cycle. However, the concerns raised by the Bank
of International Settlements' proposals for reforming capital adequacy ratios
centre on the likelihood of pro-cyclical credit quality and countercyclical ag-
gregate default risk, which are clearly destabilising.
4
In that respect, I nd
that for the default probability to be pro-cyclical|that is, for default risk to
2
See also Diamond (1991), where borrowers can choose the optimal debt maturity.
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For example, see Eatwell and Taylor (2000) and Eichengreen et al. (1995).
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See the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) and Borio et al. (2001).
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fall during recessions and rise during expansions|the disruption caused by
early liquidation has to be small. In that case, international nancial reg-
ulators aiming to maintain a stable investment environment should impose
fewer restrictions on short-term capital ows in times of expansion and more
during recession. In contrast, if the disruption caused by early liquidation is
large then aggregate default risk becomes counter-cyclical. Regulators should
then be imposing fewer short-term capital controls during recessions.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 presents the
model; Section 3 derives the lenders' and borrower's optimal strategies when
information is complete and the loan rate is exogenously xed. When the
game is sequential, the solution involves pure dominant strategies; when it
is simultaneous, the solution concept is mixed strategies Nash equilibrium.
Section 4 studies the case of incomplete information when the loan rate is a
function of the fundamental realisation; Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
2.1 Investment technology and timing
There is a single domestic borrower/entrepreneur and a large number of
atomistic risk-averse investors (outside creditors). The investment project is
not self-nancing and requires two periods to complete. Gross project income
at the end of period 2 is given by:
y = (E + L) (1)
E denotes the amount of internal illiquid endowments available to the
project, L is the amount of outside lending, and  is a random productivity
shock which is positively correlated with the state of domestic macroeco-
nomic fundamentals. In the context of foreign direct investment, L can be
4
interpreted as the amount of project nance which is obtained abroad.
The fundamental realisation  is drawn from a uniform distribution over
the closed interval [0; 1] and is assumed to be perfectly observable by the
borrower and lenders. The borrower can also access liquid reserve assets A.
These yield the riskless rate of return r
A
, which coincides with the (xed)
world rate of interest. Initially, outside credit is obtained for two periods.
However, at the end of the rst period a proportion  2 [0; 1] of lenders
may decide not to roll over their loans into the second period. In that case,
the borrower's liquid assets A can be used to cover the resulting liquidity
shortfall. Therefore, the magnitude of  represents liquidity risk, measured as
the probability that the borrower will lose the project's rents due to excessive
liquidation incentives of lenders.
The early withdrawal of funding induces: (i) A marginal cost k < 1 to the
investment project, borne by the borrower. The parameter k captures the
marginal project disruption brought about by early liquidation. The total
disruption cannot exceed the aggregate amount of lending. (ii) A marginal
loss c < 1 on the individual loan amount, borne by each lender. This pa-
rameter can be considered to be negatively correlated with the amount of
short-term capital controls in place, and positively correlated with the cost
of enforcing repayment. The values of k and c could, in principle, both be
inuenced by the domestic and international regulatory framework.
The borrower thus has to satisfy the following linear constraint on the
project's net return:
(E + L)  kL+ (1 + r
A
)(A  L)  (1  )(1 + r
L
)L (2)
On the LHS is the borrower's return; the value of the investment project
declines in the amount of early liquidation L. The decline is monotonically
increasing in the marginal cost of disruption k and in the proportion of
lenders  who do not roll over their loan in period 1. Some of the borrower's
5
liquid assets A then have to be used to cover the shortfall from liquidating
lenders. On the RHS is the total payment to lenders; the borrower's cash
outow is increasing linearly in the rate of return (loan rate) r
L
oered to
the proportion 1   of lenders who stay on for the maturity of the project.
Loans rate can be xed (Section 3) or monotonically decreasing in the state
of fundamentals (Section 4), thereby introducing interest rate (market) risk.
2.2 Strategies and payos
A total amount of outside funding L has been committed at the start of the
game (t = 0) for one or two periods. In the rst period (t = 1), individ-
ual lender i can Stay, with probability , or Leave (1   ). The borrower
can Default on the project with probability P or Repay (1   P ), either at
t = 2 (Section 3.1) or simultaneously with the lenders (Section 3.2). The
nal payos of the game are represented in strategic form in Table 1. The
strategies of lender i and the single borrower are in rows and columns. Their
respective payos are given by the top and bottom entries for each strategy
combination:
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Table 1
The strategic form game
Repay [1  P ] Default [P ]
Leave L
i
(1  c) L
i
(1  c)
 (E + L)  kL+ (1 + r
A
)(A  L) (1 + r
A
)(A  L)
Stay L
i
(1 + r
L
) 0
1   (E + L) + (1 + r
A
)A  (1 + r
L
)L (1 + r
A
)A
5
Lender i's payo are a function of their individual loan while the borrower's payos
involve the aggregate amount of funding.
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In pure strategies, all lenders Stay ( = 0) or Leave ( = 1), while the
single borrower Defaults (P = 1) or Repays (P = 0) with certainty. In
mixed strategies, the probability  then measures the proportion of atom-
istic lenders opting to liquidate their investment at t = 1. In contrast, the
project's default probability P reects a strategic decision by the borrower
independently of any information held by the lenders regarding their true
type. In principle, the borrower can default even if no creditor has with-
drawn early. Therefore, P and  can, respectively, be interpreted as default
and liquidity risk measures.
2.3 The optimal lending decision
The return process for the investment project follows a Bernoulli distribution
with success dened as repayment, with probability 1 P , and failure dened
as default, with probability P . The rst two moments of lender i's payo if
she rolls over her loan at t = 1 are:
E(x
i
) = (1  P )(1 + r
L
)L
i
(3)

2
(x
i
) = P (1  P )(1 + r
L
)
2
L
2
i
Moreover, lenders cannot expect to receive less than the constant riskless
rate of return r
A
. This implies the following weak participation constraint:
Ex
i
 (1 + r
A
)L
i
, 1 + r
L

1 + r
A
1  P
(4)
Inequality (4) guarantees that, in expectation, the lender obtains at least
the riskless rate of return. Given the value of r
A
, the credit spread r
L
  r
A
is always positive and increasing in the default probability.
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The amount of funding provided by lender i at t = 0 is determined by
simple quadratic optimisation. In the absence of strategic considerations,
lender i maximises the quadratic utility function:
U
i
= E(x
i
)  b
i

2
(x
i
) (5)
Lenders are dierentiated according to their risk aversion coeÆcient b
i
.
I assume b
i
to be a random variable uniformly distributed on the closed
interval [b
min
; b
MAX
] = [b; 1] with b  0, wlog. The minimum lower bound
b = 0 corresponds to risk neutrality. Given the upper bound b
MAX
= 1,
higher b values reect higher aggregate risk aversion. Substituting equations
(3) into (5) and maximising with respect to L
i
yields the amount of funding
that lender i provides at t = 0:
L

i
=
1
2b
i
(1 + r
L
)P
(6)
The optimal amount of funding is decreasing in the loan rate, lender i's
risk aversion coeÆcient and the default probability. Aggregating the individ-
ual loan amounts in (6) over the interval [b; 1] yields the aggregate outside
funding obtained at t = 0:
L

=
Z
1
b
L

i
db
i
=  
ln b
2(1 + r
L
)P
> 0 (7)
L

is decreasing in lenders' aggregate risk aversion. Ceteris paribus, larger
b values result in less of the investment project being externally nanced.
8
3 Equilibrium liquidity and default risk with
xed loan rates
3.1 The sequential game with perfect information
I begin by analysing the two-period game with sequential play. First, at
t = 1 the lenders decide whether to Stay or Leave. The borrower observes
their move and decides to Repay or Default at t = 2 (Figure 1, Panel A).
When does lender i have an incentive to Stay on to period 2? From the payo
matrix in Table 1, the expected return from rolling over her loan at t = 1
should not be less than the certain return from early withdrawal:
(1  P )(1 + r
L
)L
i
 (1  c)L
i
This yields a threshold level P

for the default probability:
6
P  P

=
c+ r
L
1 + r
L
(8)
For the probability range P  P

, Staying is weakly dominant, implying
zero liquidity risk:  = 0. Conversely, for the range P > P

all lenders
Leave, implying  = 1. Note that P

< 1 because c < 1 by investors'
limited liability. The threshold level P

is strictly increasing in c and r
L
.
Equivalently, the default probability range P 2 (P

; 1] is smaller for higher
c and r
L
. Imposing a greater penalty to foreign investors for not rolling over
their loans and/or oering them higher loan rates makes early withdrawal
suboptimal, ceteris paribus.
The borrower's best response in period 2 thus depends on the default
probability P . There are two cases. First, if P  P

then  = 0 and their
best response at t = 2 is to complete the project and Repay if and only if:
6
If P = P

then lender i is indierent between her two pure strategies.
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2
(E + L) + (1 + r
A
)A  (1 + r
L
)L > (1 + r
A
)A
This implies a threshold level of fundamentals 
min
2
as a function of the
lending rate r
L
, the project's internal endowment E and aggregate lending
L above which the borrower will Repay the creditors:

2
> 
2
=
(1 + r
L
)L
E + L
(9)
If the fundamental realisation is less than 
2
then the borrower will default
even if all outside creditors decide to roll over their investment at t = 1. The
threshold level increases in r
L
and L and decreases in E. Intuitively, higher
lending rates and/or smaller internal endowments make default more likely.
In contrast, the positive contribution of the amount of aggregate lending to
outright default reects a moral hazard problem. The fact that no lender has
left by the end of the rst period ( = 0) improves the project's expected
return and presents the borrower with a greater incentive to Default. Equiv-
alently, the range of fundamentals for which the borrower has an incentive
to Repay is smaller.
However, the default probability threshold P

in equation (8) need not
be consistent with the borrower's best response. Provided P  P

, from
(9) the borrower will always default if 
2
> 1. Then (1 + r
L
)L > E + L,
equivalently L >
E
r
L
, and the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is
fStay;Defaultg. Is this Pareto-inferior outcome a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of the extensive form game? In the subgame commencing at t = 0, if
lenders know that the borrower will certainly default, they will never Stay
because 0 < L
i
(1   c) for all L
i
> 0. Indeed, in that case the project will
obtain no outside credit at t = 0. Equivalently, P

is strictly less than 1, so
it is inconsistent with certain default. Therefore, fStay;Defaultg is not a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
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In the second case, if P > P

then the default probability exceeds the
threshold and not rolling over at t = 1 (Leaving) becomes the lenders' strictly
dominant strategy:  = 1. Because lenders enjoy rst-mover advantage,
Defaulting at t = 2 may be the borrower's dominant strategy. Therefore, the
unique Nash equilibrium in pure dominant strategies is fLeave;Defaultg if
and only if:
(1 + r
A
)(A  L) > 
2
(E + L)  kL + (1 + r
A
)(A  L)
The borrower will default if 
2
is less than the following upper bound:

2
< 
2
=
kL
E + L
(10)

2
is increasing in the disruption caused by early liquidation (k) and
in aggregate outside lending (L), and decreasing in the project's internal
endowment (E). The intuition is that early liquidation lowers the project's
ex post return, thus encouraging default. Conversely, more internal funding
improves the project's chances of completion following early liquidation, all
other things equal. Moreover, fLeave;Defaultg is a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium because P > P

is consistent with a default probability of one.
Finally, substituting the aggregate outside loan amount from equation (7)
into (10) it is easy to verify that higher P yields a wider range of fundamentals
for which Default is optimal for the borrower.
To summarise, in the sequential game with perfect information default
risk measured by P is exogenous. From the creditors' point of view, the
dominant strategy then involves a threshold level of P above which no lender
will roll over their loan in period 1. From equations (9) and (10), in order for
creditors' perception of P to be consistent with the borrower's best response,
it has to be that 
2
< 
2
if P < P

(good fundamentals), and 
2
< 
2
if
P > P

(bad fundamentals).
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3.2 The imperfect information game
I now proceed to derive the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium and obtain
interior solutions for  and P in a game where the lenders and borrower
decide simultaneously on their respective strategies. Equivalently, using the
Harsanyi (1967) transformation, this can be viewed as a sequential game of
complete but imperfect information. Provided the borrower cannot observe
the lenders' action, it is analytically possible to accommodate both timings.
The extensive form of this game is shown in Figure 1, Panel B. Let E
L
i
and
E
B
denote the expected payo functions of lender i and the borrower from
Table 1:
E
L
i
= [(1  P )L
i
(1  c) + PL
i
(1  c)] + (1  )[(1  P )(1 + r
L
)L
i
]
= L
i
[1  c  (1 + r
L
)(1  P )] + L
i
(1 + r
L
)(1  P ) (11)
E
B
= (1  P ) ((E + L)  kL+ (1 + r
A
)(A  L)) +
(1  P )(1  ) ((E + L) + (1 + r
A
)A  (1 + r
L
)L) +
P [(1 + r
A
)(A  L) + (1  )(1 + r
A
)A] (12)
In mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, the probability weights that each
player assigns to their respective pure strategies are determined by the other
player's expected payo maximisation. Optimising rst-order condition (11)
with respect to  yields the equilibrium default probability:
@E
L
i
@
= 0 ) P

=
c+ r
L
1 + r
L
(13)
Note that equation (13) is a generalisation of dominant strategy condition
(8). Existence of an interior solution requires P

to be a completely mixed
strategy: P

2 (0; 1) if c < 1. This is normally guaranteed by limited
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liability: individual creditors cannot lose more than the amount L
i
that they
invested in the project. If P < P

, then all creditors will stay on to t = 2
( = 0); while if P > P

, they will all liquidate early ( = 1). Note that
@P

@r
L
=
1 c
(1+r
L
)
2
 0: the default probability is non-decreasing in r
L
.
Substituting P

from equation (13) into (7) yields the following closed-
form solution for equilibrium aggregate lending as a function of underlying
parameters b, c and r
L
:
L

=  
ln b
2(c+ r
L
)
> 0 (14)
The comparative statics of aggregate lending are as follows:
(1) L

is decreasing in lenders' risk aversion as captured in b < 1, the risk
aversion coeÆcient's lower bound. This follows directly from the lenders'
quadratic utility functions.
(2) L

is decreasing in the marginal cost of early liquidation. If short-
term capital controls|proxied by c|are imposed on outside investors then
aggregate lending will decrease, and vice versa if capital controls are lifted.
(3) Aggregate lending decreases monotonically in r
L
. Thus, given any
internal endowment level E, higher loan rates imply that a larger percent-
age of the project's nance is funded internally. This is a straightforward
consequence of lenders' positive risk aversion.
Turning to the equilibrium percentage of investors who withdraw early,
optimising rst-order condition (12) with respect to P yields:
@E
B
@P
= 0 ) 

=
(E + L)  (1 + r
L
)L
(k   1  r
L
)L
(15)
The parameters determining 

in equation (15) are those involving the
borrower: c does not enter. This reects the fact that the lenders' optimal
mixed strategy is obtained from the borrower's expected maximisation. The
comparative statics of liquidity risk are as follows:
13
(1)
@

@k
< 0 and
@

@E
< 0: the percentage of investors not rolling over at
t = 1 is decreasing in the project disruption due to early withdrawal and in
the amount of internal endowment.
(2) The impact of the fundamental realisation is given by
@

@
=
E+L
(k 1 r
L
)L
,
which is always negative. Better fundamentals induce more lenders to roll
over their loans at t = 1, thus lowering liquidity risk.
(3) The impact on 

of aggregate lending is just
@

@L
=
E
(1+r
L
 k)
, which is
always positive. More lending induces a larger percentage of lenders to Stay.
Therefore, if aggregate lending is taken to be pro-cyclical, then the liquidity
risk measure is also. The cyclicality of the equilibrium measures is discussed
in more detail in Section 4. Note also the business cycle has a greater impact
on liquidity risk for lower  values. Intuitively, deteriorating fundamentals
make outside investors more sensitive to aggregate lending uctuations.
I now derive suÆcient conditions for an interior solution for liquidity risk:


2 (0; 1). First, in order for 

> 0 the expressions in the numerator
and the denominator of (15) must have the same sign. On the one hand,
the denominator (k   1   r
L
)L is always negative because k < 1 by deni-
tion: the marginal project disruption due to early liquidation cannot exceed
one, but the loan rate cannot be less than zero. On the other hand, the
numerator is negative (positive) if L > (<)
E
1+r
L
 
. Focussing on the neg-
ative case, aggregate external lending has to exceed a certain level which is
decreasing in the loan rate r
L
. This corresponds to the fundamental range
 < 
MAX

(1+r
L
)L
E+L
. In other words, if the fundamental realisation is less
than the threshold level 
MAX
then the corner solution 

= 0 arises and all
outside creditors optimally roll over their loans.
Second, the inequality constraint ensuring that 

< 1 is just:
(E + L)  (1 + r
L
)L > L(k   1  r
L
) , L <
E
k   
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Rearranging the last expression yields  > 
min
=
kL
E+L
. Fundamental
realisations below the 
min
threshold will yield the corner solution 

= 1 and
all lenders will Leave. Therefore, combined with the range for which 

> 0,
the fundamental range  2 (
min
; 
MAX
) supporting a solution 

2 (0; 1) is:
 

min
=
kL
E + L
; 
MAX
=
(1 + r
L
)L
E + L
!
(16)
Note that 
min
< 
MAX
requires k < 1+r
L
, which is always true. The fun-
damental range over which the players' equilibrium strategies are completely
mixed is thus well-dened.
4 Equilibrium liquidity and default risk with
variable loan rates
4.1 Belief specication and Bayesian updating
The assumption that the loan rate is exogenously xed is now relaxed and
r
L
made a function of the fundamental realisation. At the beginning (t = 0),
Nature selects one of two possible fundamental states s 2 fG;Bg. Figure 1,
Panel C shows the extensive form of the two-period game. Good realisations
are drawn from a continuous uniform probability distribution function (pdf)
for  over [
G
; 1]. In contrast, the Bad state is generated from a continuous
uniform pdf for  over [
B
; 1]. It is assumed that 0 < 
B
< 
G
: fundamentals
under the Bad state can get worse than under the Good state. Information is
incomplete and imperfect: the true state of fundamentals is unknown to the
players, so the extensive form involves two initial nodes corresponding to the
alternative fundamental distributions. The rst two unconditional moments
of the two pdf's are just:
15
E( j B) =
1 + 
B
2
< E( j G) =
1 + 
G
2

2
( j B) =
(1  
B
)
2
12
> 
2
( j G) =
(1  
G
)
2
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The Good state stochastically strictly dominates the Bad state because
it yields higher expected return and lower risk. The loan terms oered to
the creditors now depend on the functional relationship between r
L
and .
The borrower is assumed to observe the fundamental realisation at t = 1 and
then set the loan rate according to the following monotonically decreasing
function of 
1
:
1 + r
L
(
1
)  r
A
+
1

1
(17)
Denition (17) implies that the maximum loan rate is bounded by the
lower bound of the fundamental distribution's support in each state of the
world s 2 fG;Bg. By denition, r
MAX
L
= r
A
+
1

s
 1 is higher under the Bad
state. The minimum loan rate is r
min
L
= r
A
in both states by the common
upper bound (unity) of the fundamental distributions' support.
Importantly, although the bounds of each distribution's support and the
fundamental realisation 
1
are common knowledge, the true state of funda-
mentals is never observed by the players. Let their prior (unconditional)
beliefs at t = 0 about the underlying state be given by P
0
(G) and P
0
(B),
where P
0
(G) + P
0
(B) = 1. These are assumed to be common to the lenders
and borrower.
7
Updating of the prior beliefs about the fundamental state is
carried out using the fundamental realisation's impact on the loan rate from
equation (17). The posterior (conditional) probabilities of the Good and Bad
states are dened using Bayes' rule:
7
Specifying dierent prior beliefs for the borrower and the creditors is arguably more
realistic but would require a more complicated model.
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P1
(G j r
L
) =
P
1
(r
L
j G)P
0
(G)
P
1
(r
L
j G)P
0
(G) + P
1
(r
L
j B)P
0
(B)
(18)
P
1
(B j r
L
) =
P
1
(r
L
j B)P
0
(B)
P
1
(r
L
j G)P
0
(G) + P
1
(r
L
j B)P
0
(B)
The conditional probability of observing r
L
in state s 2 fG;Bg is specied
as the fundamentals support which yields at least that loan rate:
P
1
(r
L
j s) 
Z 1
1+r
L
 r
A

s
d
1  
s
(19)
From equation (19), the two conditional probabilities are just:
P
1
(r
L
j G) =
1  (1 + r
L
  r
A
)
G
(1  
G
)(1 + r
L
  r
A
)
; P
1
(r
L
j B) =
1  (1 + r
L
  r
A
)
B
(1  
B
)(1 + r
L
  r
A
)
Substituting these in equations (18) yields the posterior probabilities of
the Good and Bad fundamental states, where P
1
(G j r
L
) + P
1
(B j r
L
) = 1:
P
1
(G j r
L
) =
[1  
G
(1 + r
L
  r
A
)]P
0
(G)(1  
B
)
P
s=G;B
[1  
s
(1 + r
L
  r
A
)]P
0
(s)(1  
s
)
(20)
P
1
(B j r
L
) =
[1  
B
(1 + r
L
  r
A
)]P
0
(B)(1  
G
)
P
s=G;B
[1  
s
(1 + r
L
  r
A
)]P
0
(s)(1  
s
)
When are these Bayesian posterior beliefs rational? A necessary condi-
tion is that Bayesian updating should not contradict the known properties
of the underlying fundamental distribution. Intuitively, Bayesian updating
of beliefs is rational|or consistent|if observing a higher (lower)  realisa-
tion generates a higher posterior probability of the Good (Bad) fundamentals
state:
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@P
1
(G j r
L
)
@
> 0 ;
@P
1
(B j r
L
)
@
< 0 (21)
It can be shown that the posterior beliefs dened by equations (20) satisfy
(21) provided 
G
> 
B
; that is, provided the Good state stochastically domi-
nates the Bad state.
8
Therefore, the proposed Bayesian updating mechanism
oers a good description of the players' learning about the unobserved state
of fundamentals. The resulting combination of Nash strategies and rational
beliefs is then a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the extensive form game.
9
4.2 Implications for the cyclicality of default risk
I now study the impact of varying r
L
() on the equilibrium probabilities
of early withdrawal (liquidity risk) and project default. The unconditional
(prior) expectation of  at t = 0 and the conditional (posterior) expected
value at t = 1 are given by:
^

0
= E
0
() = P (G)
 
1 + 
G
2
!
+ P (B)
 
1 + 
B
2
!
(22)
^

1
= E
1
( j r
L
) = P (G j r
L
)
 
1 + 
G
2
!
+ P (B j r
L
)
 
1 + 
B
2
!
(23)
At t = 0, lenders use their unconditional expectation of fundamentals
^

0
to determine their optimal lending according to equation (6). At t = 1, the
borrower and lenders use the fundamental realisation to compute the updated
expected value
^

1
and determine their optimal mixed strategies. Substituting
^

1
into equations (13) and (15) yields:
8
The algebraic derivation is available from the author upon request.
9
A further restriction on the limits of rational beliefs would satisfy the sequential equi-
librium renement of Kreps and Wilson (1982).
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P
=
^

1
(c+ r
A
  1) + 1
1 + r
A
^

1
(24)


=
^

2
1
(E + L)  (1 + r
A
^

1
)L
[(k   r
A
)
^

1
  1]L
(25)
The equilibrium default probability is aected as follows. Equation (24)
implies
@P

@
^

1
=
c 1
(1+r
A
^

1
)
2
< 0 for all c < 1, and
@P

@c
=
^

1
1+r
A
^

1
> 0. Therefore,
P

is decreasing in the updated expected value of fundamentals. Moreover,
lowering the marginal cost of early liquidation|that is, imposing a smaller
penalty to the lender|lowers the borrower's default probability. Finally,
@P

@r
A
=
^

2
1
(1 c)
(1+r
A
^

1
)
2
> 0 for all c < 1. An increase in the riskless interest rate
raises default risk, ceteris paribus.
Regarding the equilibrium liquidity risk measure, from (25) it follows that
@

@
^

1
=
^

1
(E+L)[
^

1
(k r
A
) 2]+kL
[(k r
A
)
^

1
 1]
2
L
. Although in general this is of ambiguous sign,
for small values of k it is likely to be negative regardless of the value of
^

1
. An improved posterior belief about the state of fundamentals would thus
induce a smaller proportion of investors to liquidate early, reecting improved
condence in the project's chances of success. Second,
@

@E
=
^

2
1
[(k r
A
)
^

1
 1]L
< 0
for all
^

1
: the greater the contribution of the internal endowment to the
project, the fewer outside investors will opt to liquidate early. Third, it is
easy to check that
@

@k
=
 
^

3
1
(E+L)+
^

1
L(r
A
^

1
+1)
[(k r
A
)
^

1
 1]
2
L
is likely to be positive unless E
is very large. Thus, liquidity risk is increasing in the disruption caused to the
investment project by early withdrawals. However, if project nance relies
more heavily on internal endowment (large E) then 

can be decreasing in
k. Internal funding then exerts a mitigating inuence on liquidity risk.
Fourth, for small values of the riskless rate r
A
I obtain
@

@L
> 0, imply-
ing that more aggregate lending induces a larger percentage of investors to
liquidate early, and vice versa. The pro-cyclicality of liquidity risk|positive
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correlation between 

and the business cycle|also follows from
@

@E
< 0,
to the extent that the internal endowment's relative share of the project's
nance is likely to increase during periods of recession. Early liquidation is
therefore pro-cyclical provided outside lending is also, suggesting that short-
term capital ow reversals are less likely in slowdown periods.
Finally, dividing
@P

@
^

1
< 0 by
@

@
^

1
implies
@P

@

> (<) 0 for small (large)
values of k. Given
@

@L
> 0, the default probability is therefore pro-cyclical if
the marginal disruption to the investment project caused by early liquidation
is small, and counter-cyclical if k is large. Procyclicality of aggregate default
risk is exerting a stabilising inuence on the business cycle. In contrast, neg-
ative correlation between macroeconomic growth and default risk (or average
credit quality) amplies business cycle uctuations.
The tentative implication for nancial regulation is the desirability of
small values of k in order to maintain pro-cyclical default risk. One such
policy could involve the provision of guarantees to the project in the event of
early liquidation by outside investors. This seems consistent with the result
that lowering the charge to lenders for early liquidation reduces equilibrium
default risk. If the latter is pro-cyclical, then regulators aiming to maintain
a stable investment environment should impose fewer restrictions on short-
term capital ows in times of expansion and more during slowdown.
More generally, the cyclicality of default risk raises the question whether,
on aggregate, outside credit provision reduces the liquidity risk element of
investment projects.
10
Recall from equations (16) that an open range of
fundamentals (
min
; 
MAX
) was obtained such that liquidity risk is non-zero:


2 (0; 1). Substituting the loan rate as a function of the fundamental
realisation from equation (17) into (16) one can establish the fundamental
values outside this range. On the one extreme, the unstable range   
min
captures the case of liquidity crises amounting to total liquidation of outside
10
For example, see Cooper (1999) and Obstfeld (1998).
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funding (

= 1). On the other extreme lies the stable range of fundamentals
  
MAX
such that there is no early liquidation (

= 0). The stable range
is given by:

2
[E + L

()]  r
A
L

()  L

() > 0 ; (26)
where the equilibrium amount of lending L

is found by substituting r
L
()
from (17) into (14):
L

() =  
 ln b
2[(c + r
A
) + 1]
(27)
The stable range of fundamentals is a non-linear function of , suggesting
that the equilibrium liquidity risk measure may change discontinuously in
response to small shocks to fundamentals. A numerical simulation study of
the resulting restrictions is the next stage of this investigation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I studied the strategic interaction between many risk-averse
lenders and a single borrower in a two-period investment project with long-
term assets and short-term liabilities. The equilibrium analysis focussed on
assessing the default probability and liquidity risk for the cases of complete
and incomplete information about the underlying fundamentals. The pro-
portion of lenders liquidating early was characterised as a function of the
credit spread, the lenders' penalty for early withdrawal and the disruption
it causes the project, the contribution of the borrower's internal endowment,
and the probability distributions of fundamentals and lenders' risk aversion.
The cyclical properties of default and liquidity risk and their implications for
international nancial regulation were discussed and stable (unstable) ranges
of fundamentals were derived such that liquidity risk is zero (one).
21
There are several directions in which the model could be extended. First,
the stable and unstable ranges of fundamentals are sensitive to the under-
lying probability distribution functions; these were assumed to be uniform
to simplify the exposition. Second, the lenders and borrower may plausibly
have dierent beliefs about the unknown state of fundamentals. For exam-
ple, faced with the same exogenous uncertainty, outside investors could be
expected to be more pessimistic than the borrower. Third, fundamentals
could deteriorate endogenously if enough outside funding is withdrawn early.
Equation (1) could be generalised to consider time-varying fundamentals:
y
t
= 
t
(E + L
t
). In a repeated game, persistent fundamentals may yield
evolving equilibrium strategies capturing nancial contagion dynamics, as
dened by Allen and Gale (2000). Such extensions are the subject of future
research.
22
References
[1] Allen, F. and D. Gale 2000. Financial Contagion. Journal of Political
Economy 108: 1{33.
[2] Bulow, J. and K. Rogo 1989a. A Constant Recontracting Model of
Sovereign Debt. Journal of Political Economy 97: 155{178.
[3] Bulow, J. and K. Rogo 1989b. Is to Forgive to Forget? American
Economic Review 79: 43{50.
[4] Chui, M., P. Gai and A. Haldane 2000. International Financial Crises
and Public Policy: Some Welfare Analysis. Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin 368{76.
[5] Borio, C., C. Furne and P. Lowe. 2001. Procyclicality of the Financial
System and Financial Stability: Issues and Policy Options. BIS Papers
No. 1, Part 1.
[6] Cooper, R. 1999. Should Capital Controls Be Abolished? Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 89{125.
[7] Diamond, D. 1991. Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 709{37.
[8] Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig. 1983. Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and
Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91: 401{19.
[9] Eatwell, J. and L. Taylor 2000 (eds.) Global Finance at Risk: The Case
for International Regulation. New York: The New Press.
[10] Eichengreen, B. J. Tobin and C. Wyplosz. 1995. Two Cases for Sand in
the Wheels of International Finance. The Economic Journal 105: 162{
172.
23
[11] Harsanyi, J. 1967. Games with Incomplete Information Played by
'Bayesian' Players, I: The Basic Model.Management Science 14: 159-82.
[12] Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole 1996. Modeling Aggregate Liquidity. Amer-
ican Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 86: 187{91.
[13] Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole 1998. Private and Public Supply of Liquid-
ity. Journal of Political Economy 106: 1{40.
[14] Kreps, D. and R. Wilson 1982. Sequential Equilibria. Econometrica 50:
863-94.
[15] Krugman, P. 1979. A Model of Balance of Payments Crises. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 11: 311{25.
[16] Mella-Barral, P. and W. Perraudin 1997. Strategic Debt Service. Journal
of Finance 50(2).
[17] Morris, M. and H.-S. Shin 1998. Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-
Fullling Currency Attacks. American Economic Review 88: 587{97.
[18] Obstfeld, M. 1996. Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fullling Fea-
tures. European Economic Review 40: 1,037{47.
[19] Obstfeld, M., 1997. Destabilizing Eects of Exchange Rate Escape
Clauses, Journal of International Economics 43 (August), 61-77.
[20] Obstfeld, M. 1998. The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?,
Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 9-30.
[21] The New Basel Capital Accord, Bank of International Settlements Con-
sultative Document, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1/2001.
24

